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I. JURISDICTION 
Appellees and Defendants Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc., d/b/a Armadillo 
Express ("Armadillo") and Union Pacific Railroad Company ("UP") (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Defendants") agree with Appellant .mil Plaintiff John D. 
Archer's ("Plaintiff') jurisdictional statement. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Whether the District Court properly exercised its discretion in making an 
evidentiary ruling that Plaintiffs medical doctors are not qualified as experts to render 
opinions as to whether the absence of a rear-seat head restraint caused or contributed to 
Plaintiffs injuries. 
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the District Court's evidentiary 
ruling concerning the qualifications of an expert witness for abuse of discretion. 
Carbaugh v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 2007 UT 65 If 7, 167 P.3d 1063, 1065. 
B. Whether the District Court correctly concluded as a matter of law that neither 
Armadillo nor Union Pacific owed Plaintiff a legal duty to provide him with 
transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints pursuant to their duty to provide 
Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work. 
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews legal issues and the District 
Court's conclusions of law for correctness. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989). 
C. Whether the District Court properly concluded as a matter of law that Plaintiffs 
claims against Armadillo and Union Pacific for their failure to provide transportation to 
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Plaintiff equipped with rear-seat head restraints are barred by the doctrine of conflict 
preemption. 
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews legal issues and the District 
Court's conclusions of law for correctness. Id. 
III. STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Plaintiff defers to the statutes, rules and regulations cited by Plainti ff in his brief, 
with the exception of 49 C.F.R. § 571.202 on the grounds that Plaintiff has set forth 
subsequent versions of the regulation which are not applicable to the subject claims. The 
regulations applicable to the time periods relevant to the Plaintiffs claims are set forth 
below. 
49 CF.R. § 571.202 (1998): 
51. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies requirements for head 
restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end 
and other collisions. 
* * * 
52. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, and to 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 10,000 
pounds or less. 
53. Definitions. "Head restraint" means a device that limits rearward 
angular displacement of the occupant's head relative to his torso line. 
54. Requirements. 
S4.2. Each truck, multipurpose passenger vehicle and bus with a GVWR of 
10,000 pounds or less, manufactured on or after September 1, 1991, shall 
comply with S4.3. 
2 
S4.3 Performance levels. Except for school buses, a head restraint that 
confomis to either (a) or (b) shall be provided at each outboard front 
designated seating position.. . 
* * * 
Id. 
49 C.F.R. § 571.202 (2004): 
§ 571.202 Standard No. 202; Head restraints; Applicable at the 
manufacturer's option until September 1, 2008. 
51. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies requirements for head 
restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end 
and other collisions. 
52. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, and to 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a 4,536 kg or less, 
manufactured before September 1, 2008. Until September 1, 2008, 
manufacturers may comply with the standard in this § 571.202, with the 
European regulations referenced in S4.3 of this § 571.202, or with the 
standard in § 571.202a. 
53. Definitions. 
Head restraint means a device that limits rearward displacement of a seated 
occupant's head relative to the occupant's torso. 
* * * 
54.1 Each passenger car, and multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck and bus 
with a 4,536 kg or less, must comply with, at the manufacturer's option. 
S4.2, S4.3 or S4.4 of this section. 
54.2 Except for school buses, a head restraint that conforms to either S4.2 
(a) or (b) of this section must be provided at each outboard front designated 
seating position... 
* * * 
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S4.4. Except for school buses, a head restraint that conforms to S4.4 (a) and 
(b) of this section must be provided at each outboard front designated 
seating position.. . 
* * * 
S4.5 Except for school buses, head restraints that conform to the 
requirements of § 571.202a must be provided at each front outboard 
designated seating position. If a rear head restraint (as defined in § 
571.202a) is provided at a rear outboard designated seating position, it must 
conform to the requirements of § 571.202a applicable to rear head 
restraints... 
* * * 
Id. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on September 26, 
2004. The Plaintiff, an employee of the UP was one of six passengers in a 2001 
Chevrolet Express van ("van") owned and operated by Armadillo pursuant to its 
transportation agreement with UP. The van was rear-ended by a 1998 Honda Passport 
driven by April Gaultney ("Gaultney"), another defendant in the underlying action. 
Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants seeking damages for alleged 
permanent injuries to his neck and right shoulder. Plaintiff asserted, inter alia, a 
negligence claim against Armadillo and a Federal Employers Liability Act ('TELA") 
claim against UP for their alleged failure to provide transportation to Plaintiff equipped 
with rear-seat head restraints, pursuant to their duty to provide him with a reasonably safe 
place to work. R. at 106-17. 
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Defendants moved for summary judgment on numerous grounds. R. at 587-612. 
As related specifically to the issues raised in this appeal, Defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that: 1) neither of the Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to 
provide him with transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints as a matter of 
law; 2) Plaintiff cannot prove that his injury was foreseeable to Defendants based upon 
the undisputed facts; 3) Plaintiffs claims are barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of 
conflict preemption; and 4) Plaintiff is unable to prove, based upon . •* . red facts, 
that his injuries were caused or contributed to by the absence of a rear-seat head restraint. 
Oral argument was presented to the District Court on September 22, 2008. R. at 
1633. Based upon the parties' submissions and arguments, the Honorable Judge Judith S. 
Atherton, Judge of Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted 
summary judgment in Defendants' favor on all grounds. R. at 1633, pp. 29-30. Plaintiff 
filed a motion to reconsider. R. at 1490-1504. The District Court denied Plaintiffs 
motion, and issued its order for summary judgment in Defendants' favor. R. at 1602-09. 
Plaintiff has appealed the Court's order for summary judgment on the element of 
duty, the issue of conflict preemption, and the Court's evidentiary order pertaining to the 
qualifications of his medical doctor experts to render opinions as to whether the absence 
of a rear-seat head restraint caused or contributed to his injuries. App. Br. at 8-9. 
Plaintiff has not asserted that the District Court erred by entering summary judgment in 
Defendants' favor on the elements of foreseeability or causation, nor has he asserted that 
the Court erred by its evidentiary ruling excluding the affidavits submitted by Plaintiff 
and his experts, Drs. Gordon, Huntsman, and France. App. Br. at 9-10. Accordingly, 
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even if the Court reverses the District Court on all of the issues presented by Plaintiff, 
summary judgment on the elements of foreseeability and causation stand, and Plaintiff 
will be unable to prevail on his claims at trial. Thus, Plaintiffs appeal is moot, since the 
Court's ruling on the issues presented will not entitle him to a trial on his claims. 
V. RELEVANT FACTS 
The District Court found the following facts to be undisputed and material to Defendants' 
motion, and based thereon, entered summary judgment in Defendants' favor. R. at 1633, 
pp. 29-30. 
1. At approximately 5:45 a.m. on September 26, 2004, a motor vehicle accident 
occurred on Interstate Highway 15, near the intersection of 9000 South in the City of 
Sandy in Salt Lake County. R. at 615-18. 
2. The accident occurred between a 2001 Chevrolet Express van operated by Casey 
Sorensen ("Sorensen"), an employee of Armadillo, and a 1998 Honda Passport, owned 
and operated by Gaultney. Id. 
3. On the date of the accident, Armadillo had a contract to provide transportation 
services to UP employees pursuant to the "Agreement for Transportation Services" 
("Agreement"). R. at 620-22. 
4. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was a UP employee, and was being 
transported by Armadillo in the course and scope of his employment from Salt Lake City 
toMilford. R. at 272-74, 625. 
6 
5, The van contained two individual front bucket seats, and three rows of bench 
seats. The two front seats were equipped with head restraints. However, the rear bench 
seats were not. R. at 626. 
6. The van was not out of compliance with federal requirements. Federal regulations 
did not require that head restraints be installed on the rear seats. R. at 651-52. 
7. Deven Neider was seated in the front passenger seat. Chuck Archer and Gordon 
Openshaw were seated on the first bench seat. Plaintiff was seated on the second bench 
seat. Ron Gates and John Bath were seated on the rear bench seat. All of these 
individuals were UP employees. R. at 626-29. 
8- Immediately preceding the impact, Plaintiff was turned around, speaking to John 
Bath, who was seated on the passenger side of the rear bench seat. R. at 632. 
9. At the time of impact, Plaintiff was still seated in a turned position, and he 
grabbed the back of the bench seat with his right arm, with his elbow pointing towards 
the rear. R. at 942, 663. 
10. Neither Plaintiff nor Gaultney have any knowledge of anything that Sorensen did 
that caused or contributed to the accident. R. at 630-31, 634, 642, 689. 
11. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries to his neck and right shoulder due in part 
to the absence of a head restraint on his rear bench seat. R. at 272-74. 
12. At the time the van was manufactured, the National Highway Safety 
Transportation Administration ("NHSTA") did not require automobile manufacturers to 
install rear seat head restraints. R. at 691-94 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 571.202 (1998)) 
("FMVSS 202"). 
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13. On March 14, 2005 (after the subject accident), the NHSTA amended 49 C.F.R. § 
571.202 to change the manufacturing requirements for front seat head restraints, and 
imposed specific manufacturing requirements for head restraints voluntarily installed in 
rear seats. R. at 696-98 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 571.202 (2005)). At that time the NHSTA 
specifically considered a proposal to mandate the installation of rear-seat head restraints, 
and expressly rejected that proposal, R. at 702-03 (citing 69 F.R. 74848). 
14. The NHSTA acknowledges that the use of properly manufactured head restraints 
reduces the possibility of neck injuries in rear-end collisions, but will not prevent all such 
injuries. ("The agency estimates that approximately 272,464 whiplash injuries occur 
annually. This final rule will result in approximately 16,831 fewer whiplash injuries, 
15,272 involving front seat occupants and 1,559 involving rear seat occupants.") R. at 
704; see generally R. 702-07. 
15. On the date of the incident, UP had a safety rule in place that required employees 
to "report, correct, or protect any unsafe condition or practice." R. at 806, 643-44. 
16. Rule 70.1 applied to Plaintiff at all times relevant to the accident. R. at 643. 
17. Prior to the accident, Plaintiff had never raised any safety concerns to UP or 
Armadillo regarding the absence of rear-seat head restraints in Armadillo's vehicles. R. 
at 579. 
18. Prior to the accident, Plaintiff had never made a request to UP or Armadillo to be 
transported only in vehicles that were equipped with rear-seat head restraints. R. at 636-
37. 
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19. Prior to the accident, Plaintiff never suggested to anyone at UP that it require 
Armadillo to utilize only vehicles that had rear seat head restraints. R. at 637. 
20. Prior to the accident, Plaintiff was unaware of any other UP employee 
complaining about the absence of rear-seat head restraints in transportation vehicles. R. 
at 639. 
21. At no time during his employment with the UP did Plaintiff ever ride in a vehicle 
provided by the UP that he believed was unsafe due to the absence of head restraints. R. 
at 638. 
22. Prior to the accident, nobody had raised any safety issues or concerns to UP or to 
Armadillo regarding the absence of head restraints in any of Armadillo's fleet vehicles. 
R. at 579, 571. 
23. There are a variety of types of head restraints manufactured for automobile 
vehicles. Some types of head restraints are good and some are not so good. R. at 647, 
810-11. 
24. There have been cases involving incidents where head restraints have failed, and 
have been ineffective. R. at 647-48. 
25. In 2004, the NHSTA issued a report finding that the existing height requirements 
of head restraint systems being manufactured were ineffective at limiting the rearward 
movement of a person at least as tall as the average occupant. R. at 706 (citing 69 F.R. 
74848), 811. 
26. The effectiveness of an adjustable head restraint system could depend in part upon 
the adjustment of the head restraint and the height of the occupant. R. at 655. 
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27. An adjustable head restraint system was an available option for models similar to 
the subject van. R. at 652-53, 656. 
28. Neither Dr. Paul France nor Dr. Blake Ashby, the biomechanical experts retained 
by Plaintiff and Defendants respectively, were able to locate or observe a van of the same 
make or model with head restraints installed on the rear bench seats. R. at 653-54, 824, 
809. 
29. The effectiveness of a head restraint system can be affected by the position of the 
person sitting in the seat. R. at 655, 812. 
30. There are no known studies of the effectiveness of head restraints in relation to 
individuals seated in the turned manner in which Plaintiff was seated at the time of the 
accident. R. at 649, 650. 
31. Although Plaintiffs treating physicians state or infer in their respective reports 
that Plaintiffs injuries were caused or contributed to by the absence of rear-seat head 
restraints in the van, at their respective depositions they conceded thait they are not 
biomechanical or engineering experts, and that Plaintiff would likely have suffered the 
same injuries even if rear seat head restraints had been installed in the van. R. at 835-36, 
838-39, 841-42, 845-46, 847-48, 851-55, 1181-86. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court entered summary judgment in Defendants' favor on all grounds 
raised in their motion. R. at 1633, p. 30. Specifically, the Court correctly concluded, 
based upon the undisputed facts, that: 1) Defendants did not owe a duty of care to 
Plaintiff to provide transportation equipped with head restraints pursuant to their duty to 
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provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work; 2) that Plaintiffs claims are barred 
by the doctrine of conflict preemption; and 3) that Plaintiff is unable to prove that the 
absence of a rear-seat head restraint caused or contributed to Plaintiffs injuries. R. at 
1605-09, 1633. 
Plaintiff has identified as points of error the District Court's order for summary 
judgment on the element of duty, the application of the doctrine of conflict preemption, 
and its evidentiary ruling that Plaintiffs medical doctors are not qualified to render 
opinions as to whether the absence of a rear-seat head restraint caused or contributed to 
Plaintiffs injuries. App. Br. 8-10. Plaintiff has not, however, articulated any point of 
error by the District Court's order for summary judgment on the issues of foreseeability 
or causation, nor has he asserted that the District Court erred in its evidentiary ruling 
excluding the affidavits submitted by Plaintiff and his experts, Drs. Gordon, Huntsman, 
or France. Accordingly, he has waived his right to do so, and this Court should not 
consider these rulings on appeal. 
Even if this Court reverses the District Court on all points of error identified by 
Plaintiff, summary judgment on the elements of foreseeability and causation stand, and 
Plaintiff will not be entitled to a trial on his claims against Defendants. 
In the event the Court does not dismiss Plaintiffs appeal, it should affirm the 
rulings of the District Court, because they were not erroneous. 
Specifically, the District Court's evidentiary ruling that Plaintiffs medical doctors 
are not qualified to render opinions as to whether the absence of a rear-seat head restraint 
caused or contributed to Plaintiffs injuries was reasonable based upon the doctors' lack 
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of experience, knowledge or training in head restraints and biomechanics, and the fact 
that Plaintiffs own biomechanical expert, who possesses the necessary qualifications to 
render such opinions, is unable to opine to any degree of probability that a head restraint 
would have prevented Plaintiffs injuries. 
The District Court's order for summary judgment on the issue of duly was proper 
and must be affirmed. The District Court's order for summary judgment was correct 
because the undisputed facts demonstrate that: I) Defendants had no knowledge that the 
absence of a rear-seat head restraint was an unsafe or hazardous condition; 2) there is no 
evidence that other similarly situated railroads and transport companies specifically 
provide transportation to railroad employees that are equipped with i ear-seat head 
restraints; and 3) consumers such as Defendants should not be required to provide rear-
seat head restraints in vehicles used to transport its employees where NHSTA does not 
mandate automobile manufacturers to install rear-seat head restraints in their vehicles. 
Finally, the District Court correctly concluded that the doctrine of conflict 
preemption bars Plaintiffs claims against Defendants because the NHSTA specifically 
considered a proposal to require automobile manufacturers to install rear-seat head 
restraints and expressly rejected such an amendment, and the action of a state court 
imposing a duty upon Defendants as consumers of such automobiles to provide rear-seat 
head restraints in their vehicles would conflict with the objectives and purpose of 
FMVSS No. 202 established by the NHSTA. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
A, PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS MOOT BECAUSE 
HE HAS NOT APPEALED THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON TWO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HIS 
CLAIM AND WOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL ON HIS 
CLAIMS EVEN IF THIS COURT REVERSES THE DISTRICT COURT 
ON ALL OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF. 
1. Plaintiff has waived his right to appeal any alleged errors by the 
District Court granting summary judgment in Defendants' favor on 
the elements of foreseeability and causation, and its evidentiary ruling 
excluding the affidavits submitted by Plaintiff and his experts. 
Plaintiff has appealed the District Court's order for summary judgment on the 
element of duty, the application of the doctrine of conflict preemption and the Court's 
evidentiary ruling that Plaintiffs medical experts are not qualified to render opinions on 
the element of causation. App. Br. at 8-10. The Plaintiff has not, however, appealed the 
Court's summary judgment order on the elements of foreseeability or causation, nor has 
Plaintiff appealed the Court's evidentiary ruling excluding the affidavits submitted by 
Plaintiff and his experts, Drs. Gordon, Huntsman and France. 
To properly raise an issue on appeal, the appellant must specifically identify the 
points of error of the lower court, and must provide argument, analysis and case law in 
his brief explaining the basis for the purported error. See Maack v. Resource Design and 
Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 1994). An appellate court will not consider 
issues raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. State v. Phathammavong, 
860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah App. 1993). By failing to specify or identify the District 
Court's order for summary judgment on the elements of foreseeability and causation, and 
the evidentiary ruling excluding the affidavits submitted by Plaintiff as points of error in 
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his brief, Plaintiff has waived his right to do so. State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, % 2, 40 P.3d 
630, 631; Anderson v. Wright, 273 P.2d 418, 419 (Utah 1954). 
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants presented numerous 
undisputed facts to support their argument that Plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to 
prove the elements of foreseeability and causation. R. at 589-93. In opposition thereto, 
Plaintiff submitted his affidavit, as well as affidavits from Drs. Gordon, Huntsman and 
France. R. at 1276-80, 1398-1400, 1382-84, 1342-46. In their reply brief, Defendants 
moved to strike Plaintiffs affidavits on the grounds that they were "sham affidavits" 
because they contained statements inconsistent with their deposition testimony, and on 
the grounds that they contained new opinions that the experts were not qualified to render 
and which were not timely disclosed, and contained statements that were inadmissible at 
trial. R. at 1451-61. The Court agreed with Defendants' arguments and struck the 
affidavits and did not consider them. R. at 1633, at p. 29-30. Nevertheless, Plaintiff 
relies upon and cites to statements contained in those affidavits in his brief, which were 
not considered by the Court, failing even to acknowledge the Court's ruling striking the 
affidavits on the numerous grounds asserted by Defendants.1 
1
 Plaintiff disingenuously cites to the pages in his opposition brief in support of these 
"Relevant Facts" as opposed to the evidentiary source of the statements, which are in 
whole or in part the affidavits submitted by Plaintiff and his experts. Specifically, the 
following "Relevant Facts" contained in Plaintiffs brief are taken entirely from the 
affidavits that the Court struck: 21, 26-8, 34-5, 37, 41-2, and 46. In addition, Plaintiffs 
"Relevant Fact" numbers 29-33 are based in part upon the affidavits that were struck by 
the Court. App. Br. at 17-20. 
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Even if this Court finds that the District Court abused its discretion in relation to 
its ruling on the qualifications of Plaintiffs experts, the affidavits of Plaintiff and Drs. 
Gordon, Huntsman and France were ruled inadmissible based upon the numerous 
grounds asserted by Defendants, and Plaintiff has not appealed that ruling by the Court. 
Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered by the Court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2009); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 
P.2d 482, 487 (Utah App. 1990), rev'd in part on other grounds, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 
1992). 
The Plaintiff also has not appealed the Court's order for summary judgment on the 
elements of foreseeability and causation. App. Br. 8-9. Although it is anticipated that 
Plaintiff will argue that these orders are encompassed within his appeal, the points of 
error identified in Plaintiffs brief clearly fail even to reference such orders. Nor does 
Plaintiff provide any analysis as to such alleged erroneous orders. 
Thus, even if this Court finds that the District Court abused its discretion in 
making its evidentiary ruling pertaining to the qualifications of Plaintiff s experts, such a 
finding will not affect the Court's order for summary judgment on the elements of 
foreseeability and causation. 
2. The Court's order for summary judgment on the element of causation 
was correct based upon the material, undisputed admissible facts 
before it. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff has 
insufficient evidence to prove the element of causation at trial. R. at 604-08. 
Specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiff could not prove that the absence of a rear-
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seat head restraint caused or contributed to his injuries, and that in order for the jury to 
find causation, it would be required to speculate as to the existence of a number of facts 
that have no evidentiary support. Id. 
In support of their motion, Defendants presented undisputed admissible evidence 
including the report and deposition testimony of Dr. Paul France (Plaintiffs 
biomechanical expert) and Dr. Blake Ashby (Defendants' biomechanical expert), as well 
as deposition testimony of Plaintiff. R. at 658-86, 646-57, 814-32, 808-12, 624-44. 
Defendants also presented a 2004 report issued by the NHSTA pertaining to a proposed 
amendment to FMVSS No. 202 to require automobile manufacturers to install rear-seat 
head restraints. R. at 700-804. 
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Plaintiffs biomechanical expert, Dr. 
France, could not opine with any degree of probability that the absence of a rear-seat 
head restraint caused or contributed to Plaintiffs injury. R. at 605-08. At best, Dr. 
France opined that had UP provided transportation equipped with a bucket seat design 
and rear-seat head restraints, that "such changes would have reduced the likelihood for 
the impingement type shoulder injury and aggravation of Mr. Archer's cervical condition 
by significantly reducing neck motion and loading on the shoulder." R. at 665 (emphasis 
added). Plaintiff has not alleged in his Amended Complaint that Defendants failed to 
provide him with a reasonably safe place to work by not providing him with 
transportation equipped with bucket seats. Rather, his claim is premised upon the alleged 
failure to provide him with a vehicle equipped with rear-seat head restraints. R. at 110-
11, 113-114. 
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Further, Dr. France testified that there were adjustable rear-seat head restraints 
available as an option for the make and model of van involved in the accident, but that he 
was unable to locate or inspect such a head restraint. R. at 652-54, 656. Dr. France 
conceded that the effectiveness of an adjustable head restraint would depend upon the 
height of the occupant and the adjustment of the restraint at the time of impact. R. at 655. 
The NHSTA found that the manufacturing height requirements for head restraints in 
existence prior to and at the time of the subject accident were insufficient to prevent 
injury. Specifically, the 2004 NHSTA report states: 
[T]he persistence of whiplash injuries in the current fleet of vehicles 
indicates that the existing height requirement is not sufficient to prevent 
excessive movement of the head and neck relative to the torso for some 
people. Specifically, the head restraints do not effectively limit rearward 
movement of the head of a person at least as tall as the average occupant. 
R. at 706 (emphasis added and quoting 69 F.R. 74848). 
Dr. France further conceded that the effectiveness of a head restraint can be 
affected by the position of the occupant at the time of the impact, and that he was 
unaware of any crash studies that discuss the effectiveness of any rear-seat head restraint 
where the passenger is seated in a turned manner similar to Plaintiffs position at the time 
of impact. R. at 655, 649-50. Dr. France was unable to opine that had the rear-seat head 
restraint system available for van been installed, it is probable that, despite his turned 
position at the time of impact, Plaintiff would not have suffered the same injuries. R. at 
665, 1343. 
For a jury to find for Plaintiff on the issue of causation, it must find that the acts or 
failure to act by Defendants "produced harm or set in motion events that produced the 
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harm in a natural and continuous sequence." MUJI 1st Civ. 209. In order to make such a 
finding, a jury would be required to speculate as to the existence of numerous facts that 
have no evidentiary support, including: 1) the adjustable head restraint, as manufactured, 
would have been effective to prevent Plaintiffs injury; 2) Plaintiff would have properly 
adjusted the head restraint; and 3) the head restraint would have been effective to prevent 
Plaintiffs injuries in light of his turned body and neck position at the time of impact. 
Where a plaintiff cannot show, without speculation by a jury, that the injury was caused 
by the alleged breach of a duty, summary judgment on the issue of causation is 
appropriate. Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Bus. Dist., 2005 UT App 489, % 14, 126 P.3d 
781, 785 (citing Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund, 2003 UT App 438, ffif 12-16, 83 P.3d 
391,395). 
These unknown factual variables make it impossible for Dr. France to opine to any 
degree of probability that Plaintiff would not have suffered his injuries had there been a 
rear-seat head restraint had been installed in the van. If Plaintiffs biomechanical 
engineer cannot render such an opinion, the Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof on 
the element of causation. 
As discussed above, the affidavits of Drs. France, Gordon and Huntsman 
submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendants' motion were struck by the Court for 
numerous reasons and were not considered by the Court. Thus, the only admissible 
evidence before the Court to prove the element of causation were the expert reports and 
deposition testimony of his medical doctors. The Court ruled, however, that Plaintiffs 
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medical doctors were not qualified to render opinions as to whether the absence of a rear-
seat head restraint caused or contributed to Plaintiffs injuries. R. at 1633, at p. 29-30. 
Even if this Court finds that the District Court abused its discretion in its ruling on 
the qualifications of Plaintiff s experts, the evidence contained in the experts' respective 
reports and deposition testimony establishes, at best, that it was possible a rear-seat head 
restraint would have prevented Plaintiffs injuries. R. at 835-36, 838-39, 841-42, 845-46, 
847-48, 851-55, 1181-86. The only opinions rendered to a degree of "medical 
probability" were contained in the affidavits of Drs. Gordon and Huntsman, which were 
excluded by the Court for numerous reasons, and such ruling has not been appealed. R. 
at 1633, pp. 29-30. 
The only admissible evidence to be considered by this Court are the opinions 
rendered by Plaintiffs medical doctors set forth in their reports and testimony, which are 
stated in terms of possibilities, not medical probabilities. Plaintiff concedes that the 
standard for medical causation testimony is "to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability." App. Br. at p. 45. Accordingly, the admissible evidence provided by 
Plaintiffs medical doctor experts fails to meet the necessary standard for medical 
causation testimony, and is insufficient to establish causation as a matter of law. Thus, 
Plaintiff cannot prove the essential element of causation, and is not entitled to a trial on 
his claims. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
RULING THAT PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL DOCTORS ARE NOT 
QUALIFIED AS EXPERTS TO PROVIDE OPINIONS AS TO WHETHER 
THE ABSENCE OF A REAR-SEAT HEAD RESTRAINT CAUSED OR 
CONTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
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1. The Court's ruling on the qualifications of Plaintiff's experts is an 
evidentiary ruling, which this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiff incorrectly states that the standard of review of the Court's evidentiary 
rulings, excluding his medical experts from rendering opinions due to the lack of 
qualifications is that of correctness. App. Br. at pp. 9-10. As set forth in Plaintiffs 
argument, the decision by a court of whether an expert is qualified to render opinions on 
particular matters is determined pursuant to Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
App. Br. at 44. Thus, the District Court's ruling as to Plaintiffs medical experts' 
qualifications to render opinions as to causation is an evidentiary ruling which must be 
reviewed by this Court applying the abuse of discretion standard of review. 
It is well established that district courts have great latitude in making evidentiary 
rulings, including ruling on an expert's qualifications under Rule 702. Carbaugh, 2007 
UT 65 Tf 7, 167 P.3d at 1065 (citations omitted). An appellate court reviews evidentiary 
rulings made by the district court utilizing an abuse of discretion standard. Under the 
abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court will not reverse a decision to exclude 
evidence unless "the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Hollen, 2002 
UT 35,166, 44 P.3d 794, 803 (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that 
the District Court's ruling on Plaintiffs medical experts' qualifications exceeded the 
limits of reasonability. 
2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Plaintiff's 
medical doctor experts are not qualified to render opinions as to 
whether the absence of a rear-seat head restraint caused or contributed 
to Plaintiff's injuries. 
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The District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Plaintiffs medical 
experts are not qualified to render opinions as to whether the absence of a rear-seat head 
restraint caused or contributed to Plaintiffs injuries. Each of Plaintiff s medical experts 
lack the necessary expertise, knowledge or training pertaining to head restraints or 
biomechanics. R. at 1383, 1387-89. Moreover, each of Plaintiffs medical doctors 
conceded in their depositions that they are not biomechanical or engineering experts, and 
have no specialized knowledge of head restraints. R. at 845-48, 851-55, 1181-86. 
In relation to the qualifications of Plaintiff s medical doctors to render opinions as 
to whether the absence of a rear-seat head restraint caused or contributed to his injuries, 
Defendants provided their proposed undisputed fact number 32 which stated: 
32. Although Plaintiffs treating physicians state or infer in their respective 
reports that Plaintiffs injuries were caused or contributed to by the absence 
of rear seat head restraints in the van, at their depositions they concede that 
they are not biomechanical or engineering experts, and that Plaintiff would 
likely have suffered the same injuries even if rear seat head restraints had 
been installed in the van. 
R. at 593. 
At the hearing on Defendants' motion, the Court stated: 
• . . and No. 32 regarding the doctor's opinions of causation. First, I am 
agreeing with counsel for the defendant with regard to the affidavits 
submitted with plaintiffs response. I'm not going to consider them. I 
don't believe that area of expertise is part of an M.D. So I have not 
considered those affidavits, and accordingly, I find there is no genuine issue 
of material fact in this case. Moreover, I am persuaded in all areas by 
defendant's position and I find the defendant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. So I am granting the Motion for Summary Judgment in each 
instance. 
R. at 1633, pp. 29-30. 
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I 
The Court's ruling to exclude opinions by Plaintiffs medical experts on causation 
was based upon the lack of qualifications, knowledge and expertise of the doctors in 
relation to head restraints and the fact that Plaintiffs own biomechanical expert, who 
possesses such qualifications, conceded that not even he could not opine with any degree 
of probability that Plaintiff would not have suffered his injuries if a head restraint system 
had been installed. R. at 1633, pp. 29-30, 603-08, 1451-62, 1467-69. 
Indeed, Dr. France, Plaintiffs designated expert in the field of biomechanical 
engineering and accident reconstruction, admitted that he was unable to opine with any 
degree of probability that a head restraint would have prevented Plaintiffs injury due to a 
number of variables, including whether the head restraint was properly manufactured, 
whether the restraint was properly adjusted, the position of the Plaintiff at the time of 
impact, and the Plaintiffs pre-existing medical condition. R. at 665, 647-48, 1343. 
Where the Plaintiffs own biomechanical engineer, who has the necessary 
experience, training and knowledge, is unable to render opinions to any degree of 
probability as to whether the absence of a rear-seat head restraint caused or contributed to 
Plaintiffs injuries, it was reasonable for the Court to rule that Plaintiffs medical doctors, 
who clearly lack the necessary experience, training or knowledge of head restraints or 
biomechanics, are not qualified to render such opinions. 
As Plaintiff correctly states, "[t]he standard for medical causation is that the 
physician must testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability." App. Br. at p. 45; 
see also Keranen v. Natl R.R. Passenger Corp., 743 A.2d 703, 717 (D.C. 2000) (an 
expert's opinion must be stated in terms of probabilities, not possibilities) (citations 
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omitted). Although a medical doctor may have the training and experience needed to 
diagnose an injury that may result from a motor vehicle accident, they do not have the 
necessary qualifications to render opinions as to whether the absence of a rear-seat head 
restraint caused or contributed to such injuries. See, e.g., Keener v. Mid-Continent Cas., 
817 So.2d 347, 353 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming trial court's refusal to permit 
physician, who had received one year of training in engineering and physics of motor 
vehicle accidents, to provide expert testimony on biomechanics and injury causation). 
Based upon the information presented by the parties, the District Court's ruling 
that Plaintiffs medical doctors were not qualified to render opinions as to whether the 
absence of a rear-seat head restraint caused or contributed to Plaintiffs injuries was 
reasonable, and was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the 
District Court's evidentiary ruling excluding opinions of Plaintiff s medical experts. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT NEITHER 
ARMADILLO NOR UNION PACIFIC OWED PLAINTIFF A LEGAL 
DUTY TO PROVIDE HIM WITH TRANSPORTATION EQUIPPED WITH 
REAR-SEAT HEAD RESTRAINTS. 
Neither FELA nor negligence claims are immune to summary judgment, 
particularly where Plaintiff is unable to present prima facie evidence of each of the 
essential elements of his claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Ml U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 
S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Christiansen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2006 UT 
App 180, If 6, 136 P.3d 1266, 1269. 
Plaintiff has asserted a claim for negligence against Armadillo and a FELA claim 
against UP for failing to provide transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints. 
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To prevail on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove: 1) defendant owed a duty to 
plaintiff; 2) defendant breached its duty; 3) the breach was the proximate cause of 
plaintiffs injury; and 4) plaintiff suffered injuries or damages. Webb v. University of 
Utah 2005 UT 80, \ 9, 125 P.3d 906. The elements of an FELA claim are substantially 
similar to the elements of a negligence claim. To prevail on an FELA claim, a plaintiff 
must prove all the elements of a negligence claim, including the elements of duty, breach, 
foreseeability and causation. Handy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 841 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Utah 
App. 1992). Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff 
could not prove the elements of duty, foreseeability and causation. 
1. Duty 
Defendants do not dispute that pursuant to the FELA, a railroad owes a non-
delegable duty to its employees to provide a reasonably safe place to work. In order for a 
plaintiff to prevail on an FELA claim, however, he must prove that the railroad breached 
its duty to exercise reasonable care in furnishing him with a safe place to work by failing 
to provide him with transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints. 
2
 In his "Statement of the Issues," Plaintiffs Issue "B" sets forth an issue that was never 
presented to the District Court for determination. Specifically, Issue "B" states 
"[wjhether a rear seat head restraint is a safety device which, like other safety devices, is 
needed for a reasonably safe work place." App. Br. at 8. This is a factual issue that must 
be determined by a jury only if the Court concludes that the railroad owed a duty, and 
that employee's injuries were foreseeable. The issues before the District Court were 
whether Defendants owed a duty to provide head restraints, and whether Plaintiffs injury 
was foreseeable. The Court was not asked to make a factual finding as to whether a head 
restraint constitutes a "safety device," nor did the Court make such a factual finding. 
Thus, it would be improper for this Court to consider an issue not presented to the 
District Court. 
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The FELA does not impose strict liability upon a railroad. Id. at 1215. "The Act 
does not purport to be a workers' compensation statute. Nor does it render the employer 
the insurer of the employee's safety." Id. The basis of the railroad's liability must be its 
negligence, not the mere fact that an injury has occurred. Id.; see also Gill v. Pa. R.R. 
Co., 201 F.2d 718, 720-21 (3rd Cir. 1952). 
Plaintiff argues that, as a common carrier, Armadillo was held to a higher standard 
of care than the "reasonably prudent person" standard in protecting its passengers. As 
this Court has acknowledged: "[T]he duty owing by the carrier to its passengers for hire 
is definitely greater than such carrier owes to guests and the general public." Johnson v. 
Lewis, 240 P.2d 498, 502 (Utah 1952). However, the method of determining whether a 
carrier has fulfilled that duty "in both cases is the care of an ordinary, prudent person 
under the existing facts and circumstances . . . ." Id. The requirement of a "higher 
standard" is not the same as strict liability, nor a requirement that a common carrier 
engage in the redesign of vehicles to install equipment not required by the NHSTA. 
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants are premised upon an alleged duty of care to 
provide him with transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints, which he 
contends is required pursuant to the railroad's duty to provide him with a reasonably safe 
workplace. The determination of whether one owes a duty of care is a question of law to 
be determined by the Court. Smith v. Bank of Utah, Inc., 2007 UT App 89, ^ 7, 157 P.3d 
817, 819. The analysis for determining whether a duty exists involves consideration of 
the same general facts as one would consider in determining the existence of 
foreseeability. 
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There must be some evidence of foreseeability of injury to establish a duty of care 
upon the railroad. Handy, 841 P.2d at 1218; see also Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railway Co., 372 U.S. 108, 117-18, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963); Green v. River 
Terminal Railway Co., 763 F.2d 805, 809 (6th Cir. 1985); Richardson v. Missouri Pacific 
R. Co., 677 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1981). Wliether an injury was foreseeable must be 
determined based upon "what should have been anticipated and not merely what 
happened." Taylor v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 510 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Mo.App. 
1974). A railroad's conduct must be measured by the degree of care that persons of 
ordinary, reasonable prudence would use under similar circumstances and by what those 
same persons would anticipate from a particular condition. Handy, 841 P.2d at 1218. 
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that before the date of the accident, no 
employee had ever complained or otherwise expressed concern to UP or Armadillo about 
the absence of rear-seat head restraints in the vehicles utilized by Armadillo. UP had a 
specific safety rule that required its employees to "report, correct, or protect any unsafe 
condition or practice." R. at 806. At no time prior to the subject accident, had any UP 
employee, including the Plaintiff, ever reported the absence of rear- seal head restraints 
as being an unsafe condition, let alone suggest that it could be unsafe. R. at 571, 579,636-
637. 
Plaintiff relies upon general statements made by UP representative Michael 
Brazytis and Armadillo owner Russell Brown in their depositions regarding their general 
awareness that head restraints could prevent neck injuries. App. Br. at 33. As set forth in 
their respective affidavits, however, neither Mr. Brazytis nor Mr. Brown possess any 
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specific knowledge, training or education in automobile safety equipment, particularly 
head restraints. R. at 571, 579-580. As is true of most consumers, Defendants rely upon 
the U.S. Department of Transportation, the NHSTA and automobile manufacturers to 
evaluate and determine necessary safety equipment, and to install such equipment in 
motor vehicles. Id. 
Plaintiff sought to create the appearance of a disputed issue of material fact by 
asserting numerous facts regarding what Defendants could have done. App. Br. at 32 -
33. Plaintiff presented no evidence to the Court, however, demonstrating that any other 
railroads take any of the proposed actions to ensure that the vehicles provided to their 
employees are equipped with rear-seat head restraints. Nor did he present any evidence 
demonstrating that Defendants had received any complaints or reports that the absence of 
rear-seat head restraints was a hazardous or unsafe condition. 
One of the issues before the District Court on summary judgment was whether it 
was foreseeable to Defendants that the absence of rear-seat head restraints created an 
unreasonably unsafe work place so as to impose a duty upon them to take action. Simply 
because Defendants could have undertaken other actions does not mean that they had a 
duty under the FELA or common law to do so. Defendants can be held liable only for 
3
 Even if Defendants would have provided Plaintiff with transportation equipped with a 
bucket seat and a head restraint, Plaintiff presented no evidence that doing so would have 
made any difference in the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiffs 
biomechanical expert could not opine with any degree of probability that it would have 
had any affect upon Plaintiffs injuries. R. at 1356. Moreover, the jury would still have 
to speculate as to the existence of the facts that have no evidentiary basis in order to find 
in favor of the Plaintiff on the element of causation. 
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hazards that they reasonably could have foreseen. Gallick, 372 U.S. at 117. Defendants 
have no duty to undertake steps to protect against a hazard that was not reasonably 
foreseeable. See Adams v. CSX Transp., 899 F.2d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding 
employee's injuries could not have been reasonably foreseen by the railroad where no 
similar complaints had previously been made and the employee had never complained to 
the railroad, depriving the railroad notice of the potential injury). 
2. The federal district court's order in Wier is not binding and is 
distinguishable from the facts in this case. 
In his brief, Plaintiff relies heavily upon the unreported case of Wier v. Soo Line 
Railroad Co., 1998 WL 474098 (N.D. 111. 1998). In the underlying action, Plaintiff did 
not cite to, let alone argue, the Wier case. Even if he had, state courts are not bound by 
decisions of federal district courts on issues of federal law. Abe la v. General Motors 
Corp., 469 Mich. 603, 606, 677 N.W.2d 325, 327 (2004) ("Although state courts are 
bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing federal lav/ 
(citation omitted), there is no similar obligation with respect to decisions of the lower 
federal courts.") (citing Winget v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 210 Mich. 100, 117, 177 N.W. 
273 (1920) and 21 C.J.S. COURTS § 159, pp. 195-197; 20 AM JUR 2D, COURTS § 171, pp. 
454-455). 
Contrary to Plaintiffs argument, the facts and arguments before the Court in Wier 
were significantly different than those before the District Court in this case. In Wier, the 
federal district court denied the railroad's and transport company's motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that there existed issues of disputed fact. Wier argued, as did 
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Plaintiff in this case, that the benefits of headrests were well known and recognized by 
federal safety standards, and based upon such common knowledge, the defendants owed 
a duty to provide transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints. The opinion does 
not reflect that the defendants in that case provided any evidence to refute the purported 
"common knowledge."4 Here, however, Defendants provided undisputed evidence from 
a report issued by the NHSTA demonstrating that any "common knowledge" possessed 
by Defendants was not accurate. 
Moreover, since 1998, when the Wier order was issued, the NHSTA has 
conducted further testing, and has specifically concluded that the existing height 
requirements for head restraints manufactured prior to 2004 were ineffective at limiting 
the rearward movement of a person at least as tall as the average occupant. R. at 706 
(citing 69 F.R. 74848), 811. This significant fact, which was undisputed (R. at 1633, p. 
29), was not before the federal district court in Wier. Indeed, the NHSTA findings 
demonstrate that, to the extent Defendants possessed some "common knowledge" 
regarding head restraints, such knowledge was not accurate. 
Also, since the Wier order was issued in 1998, the NHSTA has specifically 
considered adopting a regulation requiring automobile manufacturers to install rear-seat 
head restraints, and has rejected the proposal. Thus, it would be a conflict for a state 
4
 It is significant to note that in Wier, the plaintiffs mechanical engineer expert opined 
that plaintiffs whiplash injury was a result of the absence of rear-seat headrests. Wier, at 
*2. Here, Plaintiffs biomechanical expert, Dr. France, was unable to render an opinion 
that Plaintiffs injuries were probably caused or contributed to by the absence of a rear-
seat head restraint due to a number of factors, specifically including his pre-accident 
medical condition and the turned position he was in at the time of impact. R. at 665. 
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court to impose a duty upon consumers such as Defendants to provide transportation 
equipped with rear-seat head restraints, when the federal regulating agency has 
specifically declined a proposed amendment to require such equipment be installed by 
manufacturers. See infra, at p. 33. 
3. The evidence presented in the Mortensen case is significantly different 
than the evidence before the District Court in this case. 
Plaintiff also relies heavily upon the California state appellate court decision in 
Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co,, 245 Cal.App.2d 241, 53 Cal.Rptr. 851 (1966). In 
Mortensen, the trial court granted the railroad's motion for nonsuit on the grounds that 
the evidence presented was insufficient to present jury questions on the issues of 
negligence and proximate cause under the FELA. Id. at 243. The appellate court 
reversed the trial court's order, finding that there was sufficient evidence from which a 
jury could reasonably find in the plaintiffs favor. 
Unlike this case, significant evidence was presented at trial in Mortensen 
demonstrating that: 1) although not yet required by law, that many other similarly 
situated fleet operators had installed seat belts in their vehicles; 2) issues of safety due to 
the absence of seatbelts had been raised to and discussed by the railroad's safety 
department over a six year period preceding the accident, and recommendations had been 
made to install and mandate the use of seatbelts; 3) the railroad had taken affirmative 
steps to install seat belts in all its motor vehicles weight one ton or less; and 4) expert 
testimony was presented that a seat belt would have prevented the deceased employee 
from being thrown from the vehicle, and that he would not have suffered the injuries that 
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caused his death had he not been ejected from the vehicle. Id. The appellate court 
concluded that such significant evidence would be sufficient to support a jury's verdict in 
the plaintiffs favor, and the order for nonsuit was reversed. 
Plaintiff has presented no evidence in this case to support the imposition of a duty 
by Defendants to provide to Plaintiff transportation equipped with rear-seat head 
restraints. Rather, the undisputed evidence in this demonstrates that: 1) the NHSTA 
considered and rejected a law to require automobile manufacturers to install rear-seat 
head restraints; 2) prior to the accident, no UP employee had ever reported or complained 
that the absence of rear-seat head restraints was a hazardous condition; and 3) no expert 
can opine that Plaintiff probably would not have suffered his injuries had there been a 
rear-seat head restraint installed in the subject vehicle. Moreover, Plaintiff has provided 
no evidence demonstrating that other similarly situated railroads or carriers require that 
vehicles used to transport railroad employees be equipped with rear-seat head restraints. 
Unlike the facts in Mortensen, the record here supports the District Court's order 
for summary judgment on the element of duty, and the Court's order should be affirmed. 
4. The imposition of a duty upon a consumer such as Defendants to 
provide vehicles equipped with rear-seat head restraints when the 
NHSTA does not require manufacturers to provide such equipment 
would create precedent with significant consequences. 
Plaintiff seeks to impose a legal duty upon Defendants to provide transportation to 
railroad employees equipped with rear-seat head restraints. The risk of injury to a UP 
employee due to the absence of a head restraint is no different than the risk to any other 
individual riding in a motor vehicle without head restraints. To conclude that Defendants 
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owed a legal duty of care to provide Plaintiff with a motor vehicle equipped with head 
restraints, the same duty would arguably apply to other common carriers and the general 
public. Imposing such a duty would open the floodgates to claims against common 
carriers, individual consumers, and automobile dealerships, and would leave those 
consumers exposed to liability for injuries allegedly arising from the absence of head 
restraints, but leaving them with no remedy against manufacturers for not installing them. 
See discussion ofGeier v. American Honda Motor Company, infra at p. 34. 
The FELA is not a strict liability statute, and the railroad is not an insurer of its 
employees' safety. Handy, 841 P.2d at 1215. A railroad must act as would a reasonably 
prudent person under similar circumstances in providing its employees wilh a reasonably 
safe workplace. The undisputed evidence before the District Court establishes that: 1) 
prior to the accident, no safety complaints or reports had ever been received by 
Defendants regarding the absence of rear-seat head restraints; 2) the "common 
knowledge" of the benefits of head restraints that was purportedly possessed by 
Defendants was inaccurate, based upon findings made by NHSTA; and 3) no other 
similarly situated railroad undertakes steps to ensure its employees are provided with 
transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints. 
Based upon the undisputed facts, the District Court properly ruled that Defendants 
had no duty to provide transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints to Plaintiff 
pursuant to their duty to provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work. 
Accordingly, the District Court's order for summary judgment on the element of duty 
must be affirmed 
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D. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST ARMADILLO AND 
UNION PACIFIC FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION 
TO PLAINTIFF EQUIPPED WITH REAR-SEAT HEAD RESTRAINTS 
ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF CONFLICT PREEMPTION. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs claims 
are barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption. "Conflict pre-emption occurs 'where it 
is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, . . . 
or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.'" English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 
110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 
S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941) (citations omitted)). 
1. The Motor Vehicle Safety Act and FMVSS No. 202 
In 1966, Congress enacted the Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("MVSA"). The purpose 
of the MVSA is to "reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from traffic 
accidents." 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2009). The MVSA prescribes motor vehicle safety 
standards intended to carry out the purpose of the Act. Id. The MVSA charges the 
Secretary of Transportation with the responsibility for establishing safety standards that 
meet the need for motor vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a) (2009). The Secretary of 
Transportation delegated duties to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator 
(NHSTA) to carry out the MVSA. 49 C.F.R. § 1.50 (2009). 
The NHSTA has never required automobile manufacturers to install rear-seat head 
restraints in vehicles. See R. at 691-98 and 49 C.F.R. § 571.202. In fact, in 2004 the 
NHSTA specifically considered a proposed amendment to FMVSS No. 202 to require the 
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mandatory installation of rear-seat head restraints, and expressly rejected the proposed 
amendment. R. at 702-03. As for those manufacturers that choose to install rear-seat 
head restraints, the NHSTA amended FMVSS No. 202 to impose specific manufacturing 
requirements for the head restraints based upon its finding that head restraints being 
manufactured before 2004 were ineffective at limiting rearward head and neck movement 
of a person at least as tall as the average occupant. R. at 703. 
2. Conflict preemption as applied in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. 
Despite the fact that manufacturers are not required to install rear-seat head 
restraints, Plaintiff nevertheless contends that Defendants owed him a duty to provide 
transportation equipped with such equipment pursuant to their duty to provide him with a 
reasonably safe place to work. Based upon the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning and 
holding in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 120 SCt. 1913, 146 
L.Ed.2d 914 (2000), Plaintiff would be barred from asserting any tort claim against 
Chevrolet, the manufacturer of the subject van, for the failure to equip it with rear-seat 
head restraints under the doctrine of conflict preemption. Conflict preemption applies 
because a state court's imposition of a duty upon a manufacturer to install rear-seat head 
restraints conflicts with 49 C.F.R. § 571.202, the applicable federal regulation, which 
does not mandate that manufacturers install such equipment in motor vehicles, and 
NHSTA specifically considered and rejected a proposed amendment to impose such a 
requirement. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants owed him a duty to provide transportation 
equipped with rear-seat head restraints should also be barred under the same principle. 
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In Geier, an injured motorist brought a negligence claim against American Honda 
for failing to equip its automobiles with a driver's side airbag. 529 U.S. at 865. In that 
case, FMVSS 208 applied, which required auto manufacturers to equip some, but not all, 
of their vehicles with passive restraints. Id. American Honda argued that the motorist's 
claims were preempted because it complied with the manufacturing requirements under 
the MVSA. The Supreme Court held that the motorist's claims were not expressly 
preempted under the preemption clause of the Act because the savings clause therein 
provides that compliance with a federal safety standard does not exempt any person from 
liability under common law. Id. at 867-68. The Court concluded, however, that ordinary 
preemption principles applied, and that the motorist's claims were in direct conflict with 
FMVSS 208. Id. at 874. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court analyzed the numerous considerations 
identified by the Department of Transportation in promulgating the rule permitting 
manufacturers to choose among a variety of different restraint systems. See id. at 874-81. 
Significant to the Court's analysis were the DOT's rejection of a proposed amendment to 
FMVSS 208, which would have imposed an "all airbag" standard, and the basis for its 
rejection of that standard—namely, to permit the industry time to overcome the safety 
problems and the high production costs associated with airbags. Id. As amended, 
FMVSS 208 provided for a gradual phase-in of passive restraints to permit manufacturers 
an opportunity to develop airbags and other passive restraint systems. Id. 
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The motorist's tort claim against the manufacturer depended upon the 
determination by the trial court that the manufacturer owed a duty to install an airbag 
when it manufactured the subject vehicle. The Supreme Court stated: 
In effect, petitioners' tort action depends upon its claim that manufacturers 
had a duty to install an airbag when they manufactured the 1987 Honda 
Accord. Such a state law - Le., a rule of state tort law imposing such a 
duty-by its terms would have required manufacturers of all similar cars to 
install airbags rather than other passive restraint systems, such as automatic 
belts or passive interiors. It thereby would have presented an obstacle to 
the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought. . . It 
thereby also would have stood as an obstacle to the gradual passive restraint 
phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately imposed. . . . Because the 
rule of law for which petitioners contend would have stood "as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of" the important means-related 
federal objectives that we have just discussed, it is pre-empted. 
Id. at 881-82 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added); see also International 
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493, 107 S.Ct. 805, 93 L.Ed2d 883 (1987); Fidelity 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 
664 (1982) (finding conflict and preemption where state law limited the availability of an 
option that the federal agency considered essential to ensure its ultimate objectives). 
The rationale supporting conflict preemption in Geier applies equally to the facts 
in this case.5 Here, Plaintiff sought to have a state court impose a duty upon Defendants 
to provide him with transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints. At the time 
5
 Plaintiff states that the "[c]ourt specifically held that common law actions are pre-
empted only to the extent that they actually conflict with federal requirements." App. 
Br. at 41. The text that Plaintiff cites is in relation to the Court's discussion of the 
application of express preemption under the MVSA. Defendants do not contend that 
Plaintiffs claims are expressly preempted under the MVSA. Rather, Defendants assert 
that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption, which the Court 
discusses later in its opinion. Geier, 529 U.S. at 874-85. 
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the subject van was manufactured, FMVSS 202 did not require Chevrolet, the 
manufacturer, to install rear-seat head restraints in their vehicles. R at 691-94. Even as 
amended, effective March 14, 2005, FMVSS 202 still did not require manufacturers to 
install rear seat head restraints in their vehicles. R. at 696-98. As in Geier, the NHSTA 
has specifically considered a proposal to require manufacturers to install rear-seat head 
restraints and rejected such a requirement for various reasons, including the high cost 
associated in such a requirement in comparison to the relative benefits such restraints 
would provide, safety concerns that the head restraints would obstruct the driver's view, 
and reduced vehicle utility. R. at 703. 
A federal decision not to regulate has preemptive effect "where [the] failure of. . . 
federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on the character of a 
ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the 
statute." Ray v. Atl Richfield Co,, 435 U.S. 151, 178, 98 S.Ct. 988, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 
(1978) (citations omitted). Plaintiff incorrectly argues that Geier requires that only 
common law actions that actually conflict with federal requirements are preempted. App. 
Br. at 41-42. Certainly Geier discusses "actual" or "express" preemption of Plaintiff s 
claims, but Defendants here argue that "conflict preemption" is the principle that bars 
Plaintiffs claims. 
Plaintiff contends that Geier is not applicable because he is not asserting a claim 
against Chevrolet, the manufacturer of the subject vehicle. App. Br. at 41-42. 
Defendants do not contend that circumstances in this case are the same as those in Geier. 
Rather, Defendants argue that based upon the rationale and holding in Geier, imposing a 
37 
duty upon consumers such as Defendants to provide rear-seat head restraints when the 
manufacturer is not required to do so, and imposing liability upon the consumer for 
breaching such a duty, is inconsistent and illogical. 
The rationale supporting the finding of conflict preemption in Geier is equally 
applicable to the facts of this case. Manufacturers have no duty to equip vehicles with 
rear seat head restraints, based upon the specific considerations and conclusions reached 
by the NHSTA, who are experts in vehicle equipment safety. Defendants should not be 
required by law to provide safety equipment to Plaintiff that the manufacturer is not 
required to provide to Defendants as consumers. 
3. The District Court's imposition of a duty to provide Plaintiff with 
transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints pursuant to 
UP's duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work would constitute 
state law for purposes of conflict preemption-
Plaintiff argues that the District Court erred in concluding that FELA is preempted 
by the MVSA or the FMVSS. App. Br. 39-44. The District Court did not rule that the 
FELA is preempted by the MVSA or the FMVSA. Rather, the District Court ruled that 
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants owed him a duty to provide transportation equipped with 
rear-seat head restraints pursuant to its duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work is 
barred by conflict preemption. 
Plaintiff argues that conflict preemption does not apply in this case because FELA 
is not a state law. App. Br. at 39. Defendants do not contend that FELA is in conflict 
with the MVSA or FMVSS. Rather, Defendants assert that a state court's imposition of a 
duty upon the Plaintiffs to provide to Plaintiff transportation equipped with rear-seat head 
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restraints where the federal governing agency responsible for establishing standards for 
the installation of safety equipment in motor vehicles has considered and expressly 
rejected imposing such a requirement upon automobile manufactures is in conflict with 
FMVSS No. 202, and therefore is barred by conflict preemption. R. at 1470. It is the 
state court action requested by Plaintiff which would constitute state law in conflict with 
FMVSS No. 202. 
Substantive law creates, defines, and regulates the rights and duties of the parties 
which may give rise to a cause of action. Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm 'n 
of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added). Whether a duty exists is a 
question of law for the Court to determine. Smith, 157 P.3d at 819. By ruling that 
Defendants have a duty to provide Plaintiff with transportation equipped with head 
restraints pursuant to its duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work, the District 
Court would be defining the rights and duties of the parties giving rise to Plaintiffs cause 
of action. Therein lies the "state law" that conflicts with the objective and purpose of 
FMVSS 202 forming the grounds for the application of conflict preemption. Geier, 529 
U.S. at 881-82. The District Court clearly understood this concept, and adopted 
Defendants' argument. R. at 1633, pp. 20-21, 29-30. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the District Court correctly decided that 
Plaintiffs claim based upon the alleged duty owed to him by Defendants to provide him 
with transportation equipped with rear seat-head restraints pursuant to its duty to provide 
a reasonably safe place to work is barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, Plaintiffs appeal should be dismissed as being moot, 
because even if he prevails on all of the stated issues, he has not appealed the Court's 
order for summary judgment on the elements of foreseeability and causation, nor its 
evidentiary ruling excluding the affidavits of his experts, Drs. Gordon, Huntsman, and 
France. Thus, even if the Court reversed the District Court on all issues identified by 
Plaintiff, the order for summary judgment on the elements of foreseeability and causation 
stand. If Plaintiff cannot prove these two essential elements of his claim, he is not 
entitled to a trial on his claims against Defendants. 
As to the merits of the issues raised by Plaintiff on appeal, the District Court 
correctly ruled as a matter of law that Defendants did not owe a duty to provide Plaintiff 
with transportation equipped with rear-seat head restraints pursuant to their duty to 
provide him with a reasonably safe place to work. The District Court also correctly ruled 
as a matter of law that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants for failure to provide 
transportation with a rear-seat head restraint is barred by the doctrine of conflict 
preemption. Finally, the District Court's evidentiary ruling finding that Plaintiffs 
medical doctors are not qualified to render opinions as to the causal affect a rear-seat 
head restraint might have had on Plaintiffs injuries was reasonable and was not an abuse 
of discretion. Defendants respectfully request this Court to affirm the District Court on 
all issues raised by Plaintiff on appeal. 
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